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UNCLOS III: Pollution Control in the Exclusive Economic
Zone'
I. INTRODUCTION

In January 1995, Shell Oil Company announced that it would join with
Amoco Production Company and Exxon U.S.A. to develop the deepest offshore
oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico. This rig will be constructed 125 miles southeast
of New Orleans, Louisiana, and 80 miles south of Mobile, Alabama, and should
begin operating in the latter part of 1997. The companies project this rig will
extract 60,000 barrels of oil and 200 million cubic feet of natural gas every
day.2 Technological advances now permit greater deep-sea exploitation than
previously possible. Consequently, the threat of deep-sea pollution reaches
beyond a coastal state's' territorial boundary. The authority to control pollution
in this area is the thrust of this comment.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
has been promoted as the foundation for comprehensive international regulation
of economic, environmental, and national security matters. However, UNCLOS
III is flawed. It fails to provide coastal states with sufficient authority to control
pollution beyond their territorial boundaries-especially in the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). Certain modifications of UNCLOS III are needed to
make the convention more effective.
UNCLOS III should be amended to provide coastal states with sovereign
rights over pollution control within their EEZs. Limited jurisdictional rights that
UNCLOS III currently grants are insufficient.' UNCLOS III should permit
coastal states to choose the extent to which they regulate pollution in the EEZ.
Each state, however, should still be required to meet the existing minimum
international standards for pollution control.
UNCLOS III came into force on November 16, 1994, six months after sixtyone, non-industrialized countries ratified the treaty.5 The United States has
refused to ratify UNCLOS III for the last twelve years. On June 30, 1994, the
Clinton administration notified the United States Senate Foreign Relations

Copyright 1995, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Research for this publication was funded in part by the Louisiana Sea Grant College
Program, a part of the National Sea Grant College Program, maintained by NOAA, U.S. Department
of Commerce. The Louisiana Sea Grant College Program at Louisiana State University is also
supported by the State of Louisiana.
2. Oil Companies Team to Develop Plaoform, The Baton Rouge Advocate, Jan. 25, 1995, at
A9.
3. For purposes of this comment, the phrase "coastal state" will refer to nations, e.g., the
United States; while the phrase "state of the United States will refer to individual states, e.g.,
Louisiana.
. 4. For discussion of differences in sovereign rights and jurisdiction under UNCLOS
HIl,see
infra text accompanying notes 55-58.
5. S.Con. Res. 72, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (i994).

1166

6LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Committee that the President would sign the agreement, with modifications for
deep-sea mining provisions.' The President's signature7 provisionally binds the
United States to the agreement and the modified deep-sea mining provisions of
UNCLOS III for four years, even without the advice or consent of the United
States Senate." During the 104th Congress, the Senate will discuss the
ratification of UNCLOS III in its entirety. The suggested modifications should
be made prior to that time.
UNCLOS III divides the oceans into five major jurisdictional zones. Part
II of this comment introduces these zones. Part III discusses pollution control
mechanisms currently impacting the EEZ and demonstrates how these mechanisms provide inadequate pollution protection.
To clarify the rationale behind the current pollution control mechanisms of
the EEZ, Part IV of this comment discusses the evolution of the EEZ. In
connection with Part IV, Part V examines pollution control laws countries have
independently enacted that affect the EEZ. This section demonstrates that the
extension of the EEZ from a mere economic zone to a pollution control zone
would be simply a matter of codifying coastal states' customary practices.9
Part VI of this comment discusses the possibility of adopting this extension
and what role Louisiana might play in controlling pollution within its EEZ
should a pollution extension be adopted. Finally, Part VII recommends specific
improvements for UNCLOS III to transform it into a foundation for comprehensive regulations concerning economic, environmental, and national security
matters.

II. THE

DIFFERENT ZONES UNDER UNCLOS

III

UNCLOS III divides the ocean into five zones: (i) the territorial sea; (ii) the
contiguous zone; (iii) the exclusive economic zone; (iv) the continental shelf; and
(v) the high seas. In each zone, a coastal state may exert various levels of

6. U.S. Will Sign Modification Agreement, Oceans Pol'y News (Council on Ocean Law,
Washington, D.C.), June 1994, at 1.
7. S. Con. Res. 72, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). "Ratification" is:
[T]he act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a
State... Although the advice and consent of the Senate is frequently spoken of as
ratification, as a matter offact the Senate does not ratify treaties but, instead, advices and
consents to their ratification by. the President
William W. Bishop, Jr., International Law Cases and Materials 119-20 (3d ed. 1962). "Signing" a

treaty does not obligate a State to ratify the treaty. Instead, the signature provides the State with an
interim period wherein the State can give careful consideration to ratification. Id.
8. For a detailed discussion of the President's authority to make such an agreement without
the advice and consent of the Senate, see Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United
States §303 (1987).
9. International law can be created from international agreements, customary practice or
general principles of common legal systems. Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 102 (1987). See also infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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control depending on the activity. The amount of control given to a state
decreases as one moves away from a state's territorial sea.
A. The TerritorialSea
Under Article 3 of UNCLOS III, the breadth' ° of the territorial sea is
established as twelve nautical" miles from the baseline. 2 In this area, a
coastal state has sovereign rights 3 regarding activities within the water column,
within the airspace above the sea, and on the bed and subsoil beneath the sea.'
The coastal state may regulate "the preservation of the environment of the coastal
State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof."' 5 In
addition, coastal states may require foreign ships, exercising their right of
innocent passage, to use designated sea lanes in the territorial sea. These laws
place particular restrictions on nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying noxious
substances.' 6
Other provisions of UNCLOS III place limitations on the exercise of state
sovereignty in this zone. The primary limitation is the right of innocent passage' 7-- the right of other countries to engage in navigation or overflight when
the passage "is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State."' 8

10. "Breadth" is defined as "[t]he measure or dimension from side to side as distinguished from
length or thickness ... wide extent or scope ....
The American Heritage Dictionary 205 (2d
College ed. 1985).
11. A "nautical mile" is defined as "an international and U.S. unit equal to 1,852 meters, or
about 6,076 feet." Id. at 833. A "standard mile," however, is defined as "[a] unit cf length equal
to 5,280 feet, 1,760 yards, or 1,609.34 meters .... " Id. at 796. Consequently, a nautical mile is
796 feet longer than a standard mile. Any reference to a "mile" in this comment refers to a nautical
mile and not a standard mile.
12. U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea, U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter referred to by its UNCLOS
III article number].
UNCLOS III Article 5 states:
Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring
the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on largescale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
In special cases; i.e., where reefs, islands, mouths ofrivers or bays lay on the fringes of coastal states,
UNCLOS IN provides alternative ways for measuring the baseline. For further discussion of this
issue, see UNCLOS III Articles 6-10.
13. For discussion of differences in sovereign rights and jurisdiction, see infra text
accompanying notes 53-58.
14. UNCLOS I Article 2.
15. UNCLOS III Article 21.
16. UNCLOS III Article 22.
17. UNCLOS III Article 17.
18. UNCLOS III Article 19 defines "innocent passage" as passage that is not prejudicial to the
peace and good order of a coastal state. The article then provides examples of when passage is
considered prejudicial:
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B. The ContiguousZone
In the contiguous zone, a coastal state "may exercise the control necessary
to... prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
and regulations within its territory or territorial sea."' 9 This zone extends from
three miles to a maximum of twenty-four miles. As in the territorial sea,
regulation in this zone is limited by the right of innocent passage.
Coastal states' powers within the contiguous zone are more limited than in
the territorial sea. These limited powers include the power to control and
prevent infringement of the coastal states "sanitary laws." This phrase is not
defined by UNCLOS III; therefore, it may be interpreted either broadly or
narrowly. The broad definition of sanitation is the "formulation and application
of measures designed to protect public health. ' 20 This definition is consistent
with the breadth of police powers exercised by a state of the United States.
These broad powers allow the state to promulgate laws and regulations to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. 21 However, the narrow definition
of sanitation is the "disposal of sewage." This definition limits coastal states
to controlling waste disposal in the contiguous zone.
C. The Exclusive Economic Zone
The EEZ is an area extending from twelve miles to a maximum of two
hundred miles from the coastline. 3 In this zone, a coastal state has sovereign
rights of exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of natural
resources. These include living and non-living resources of the sea-bed, subsoil,

Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following
activities: (a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (1) any
exercise or practice with weapons ofany kind; (c) any act aimed at collecting information
to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State; (d)any act of propaganda
aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal State; (e) the launching, landing
or taking aboard ofany aircraft; (f) the launching, landing or taking aboard of any military
device; (g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; (h) any
any fishing activities;
act of wilful and serious pollution, contrary to this Convention; (i)
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; (k) any act aimed at interfering with
any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal state;
any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
or (1)
Id.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

UNCLOS IIIArticle 33.
The American Heritage Dictionary 1090 (2d College ed. 1985).
Black's Law Dictionary 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
The American Heritage Dictionary 1090 (2d College ed. 1985).
UNCLOS III Article 57.
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and superjacent waters, e.g., oil, gas, and fisheries.24 In addition, a coastal state
has sovereign rights regarding the exploitation and exploration of energy
production by water, currents and wind.'
Within the EEZ, a coastal state has limited jurisdiction concerning the
performance of marine scientific research, the protection and preservation of the
marine environment, and the use of artificial islands and structures.26 A coastal
state has the exclusive right 7 to construct, authorize and regulate the construction
and use of such offshore structures. 28 A coastal state cannot require special
design or construction standards for vessels operating within the state's EEZ.
D. The Continental Shelf
The continental shelf2 9 is comprised of the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas extending beyond the territorial sea to the outer edge ofthe continental
margin.3" This distance is, at a maximum, three hundred and fifty miles.
A coastal state enjoys sovereign rights regarding the exploration and
exploitation of natural resources on the continental shelf.3" These rights, under
UNCLOS III, are exclusive. If the coastal state does not engage in the exploration
and exploitation of minerals on the continental shelf, no foreign state may do so

without the consent of the coastal state.32 In addition, these rights are effective

under UNCLOS III absent any affirmative action by coastal states, e.g., occupation
or proclamation.3
E. The High Seas
The high seas are the waters beyond the EEZ or the area beyond the limits of
the continental shelf when that area extends beyond two hundred miles. In this
area, all states enjoy freedom of navigation, overflight, placement of submarine

24.

"Superacent" waters can be defined as those waters which are lying immediately above or

upon the continental shelf. The American Heritage Dictionary 1220 (2d College ed. 1985).
25. UNCLOS III Article 56.
26.

Id.

27.

The difference between "exclusive rights" and "sovereign rights" is not clear.

The

amendment recommended in Part V infra would clarfiy this distinction.
28.
UNCLOS III Article 60.
29.
The continental shelf is defined as "a generally shallow, flat submerged portion of a
continent, extending to a point of steep descent to the ocean floor." The American Heritage

Dictionary 317 (2d College ed. 1985).
30. UNCLOS III Article 76. The "continental margin" is comprised of "the submerged
prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the

shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the
subsoil thereof." Id.
31. UNCLOS III Article 77. Under UNCLOS IlI, "natural resources" include mineral and other
non-living resources as well as other living organisms either mobile or immobile.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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cables and pipelines, construction of artificial islands, fishing, and scientific
research. 4
In exchange for these freedoms, coastal states assume certain duties. A coastal
state must be certain that the master, the officers and, to a limited extent, the crew
of its ships are familiar with international regulations regarding safety at sea,
prevention of collisions, reduction and control of marine pollution, and maintenance of communications by radio." These duties are designed to prevent

collisions and navigational incidents that could result in injury or loss oflife to any
nation's citizens; damage to ships, artificial islands,
or other installations ofanother
36
state; or damage to the marine environment.
III. POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE EEZ UNDER UNCLOS III

A. The Compromiseand CurrentPollutionControl
During the UNCLOS III negotiations, participants disagreed whether pollution
control standards should be global or regional." Less developed nations feared

that "global" requirements would force them out ofinternational trade because they
lacked capital to meet these requirements. A compromise was reached to gain a
majority vote on the treaty.3" This compromise combines global and regional
pollution control standards. It permits global control of pollution by requiring
coastal states to meet international minimum standards.3 9 At the same time, one,
or a group of, coastal states could exercise regional control by petitioning a
competent international organization for authority to enact more stringent pollution
control laws.'
The International Sea-Bed Authority (hereinafter "Authority") is one
example of a competent international organization. Article 145 of UNCLOS III
gives broad and general powers to the Authority. Article 145 states:

34.
35.

UNCLOS III Article 87.
UNCLOS III Article 94.

36.

Id.

37. "Global" pollution control refers to international laws that require coastal states to take
certain measures to prevent pollution of the oceans. Unilateral actions by individual coastal states
are inconsistent with the idea ofglobal pollution control. "Regional" pollution control refers to acts
promulgated by individual coastal states or agreements with individual coastal states that are designed
to control 'pollution of the sea. These acts would apply only to the regions where the coastal state
exercises its sovereign rights.
38. Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States' Use of Trade
Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, fWhales, and Other International Marine Living

Resources, 21 Ecology L.Q. 41 (1994).
39. Minimum international standards may be found in: (1) general international law; (2)treaty
law; or (3)standards established by international organizations. Standards established by international
organizations are binding on signatories ofUNCLOS Ill even ifsuch signatories are not members ofthe
international organization promulgating the standard. Jonathan I.Chamey, The Marine Environment
and the 1982 UnitedNations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, 28 Int'l Law. 879, 888-89 (1994).

40.

UNCLOS III Article 211(6).
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Necessary measures shall be taken in accordance with this Convention

with respect to activities in the Area to ensure effective protection for
the marine environment from harmful effects which may arise from
such activities. To this end the Authority shall adopt appropriate rules,
regulations and procedures for inter alia:
(a) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other
hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and of
interference with the ecological balance of the marine environment,
particular attention being paid to the need for protection from harmful
effects of such activities as drilling, dredging, excavation, disposal of
waste, construction and operation or maintenance of installations,
pipelines and other devices related to such activities ...
One commentator has suggested that the broader and more inclusive language of
Article 145 be used throughout UNCLOS III, but the delegates to UNCLOS III
onerous environmental obligations that
feared the broad language would impose
42
many states could not afford to fulfill.
The compromise resulted in separate articles, each implementing unique
standards and remedies for specific types of pollution. These standards and
remedies are discussed in Articles 192-244 of UNCLOS III and apply to the
entire ocean. Pollution is classified by origin: land-based sources, sea-bed
activities, vessels, ocean dumping, and atmospheric discharges.
Regarding land-based pollution and pollution from sea-bed activities,
UNCLOS III requires states to take measures, including the adoption of laws and
regulations, to prevent pollution of the marine environment. 43 These regulations, furthermore, must be no less effective than the accepted minimum
international standards.'
UNCLOS III also requires that international minimum standards be
maintained to prevent vessel source pollution. A coastal state may enact more
stringent pollution standards upon petitioning a competent international
organization. 45 This right, however, is limited to situations in which a state
believes minimum international standards are inadequate to protect its EEZ due

41. UNCLOS II Article 145.
42. McLaughlin, supra note 38, at 41.
43. UNCLOS III defines "pollution of the marine environment" as
[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious
effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance
to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of
quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.
UNCLOS III Article 1(4).
44. Louis B. Sohn & Kristen Gustafson, The Law of the Sea in a Nutshell 200, 205 (1984);
Charney, supra note 39, at.888-89.
45. An example of a "competent international organization" is "The Authority" created by
UNCLOS II. UNCLOS III Articles 156-58. See also supra text accompanying note 41.
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to special concerns such as fragile ecosystems." For example, Article 234
grants coastal states limited power to reduce and control vessel source pollution
in ice-covered areas of the EEZ. Article 234 is invoked only by a showing that
marine pollution could cause irreversible destruction to the ecological balance of
the coastal state.47 These additional laws may relate only to discharges or
navigational practices. States may not require design, construction, manning or
equipment4 standards different from the accepted international minimum
standards.
Ocean dumping and atmospheric pollution within the territorial sea, EEZ or
continental shelf area are also regulated by international standards. Coastal states
have the right to regulate ocean dumping in the EEZ, but such regulation must
be no less effective than minimum international standards.49
B. Problems With Pollution Control Under UNCLOS III
The first problem with UNCLOS III's pollution control laws is a classification based on sources of pollution (pollution from vessels, dumping, etc.) and not
on the zone in which the activity is performed (EEZ, territorial sea, etc.).
Classifying pollution control based on the activity rather than on the area of
occurrence causes confusion and chaos to such an extent that UNCLOS III's goal
of uniformity will never be met.50 The pollution control provisions in the EEZ
are unclear. One commentator has noted that the "most complex and easily
misunderstood of coastal states rights in the economic zone is the jurisdiction
with respect to the preservation of the marine environment."'1 It would,
therefore, be more appropriate to control pollution in the EEZ by extending a
state's sovereign rights in the EEZ from rights to conduct economic activities to
rights to control pollution activities.5 2

46. Special concerns may include unique geographical concerns, such as the ice covered areas
in Canadian waters which were recognized as fragile ecosystems under UNCLOS III
allowing Canada
to exert additional control over activities in their EEZ.
47. UNCLOS III Article 234.
48. UNCLOS III Article 211(6)(c).
49. UNCLOS III Article 211(5).
50. One of the primary purposes of UNCLOS III was to "create some international legal order
to regulate these highly sensitive issues before there is further unilateral action by nation-states which
would tend to create disorder and chaos." David L. Larson, Major Issues of the Law of the Sea 1
(1976).
51. Bernard H. Oxman, An Analysis of the Exclusive Economic Zone as Formulated in the
Informal Composite NegotiatingText, cited in Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Law of the Sea: State Practice
in Zones of Special Jurisdiction 57, 75 (1982). Oxman recognizes that foreign ships in a coastal
state's EEZ are the primary concern of the state. Unlike any other of the coastal state's rights in the
EEZ, this jurisdiction directly limits a ship's freedom of navigation. As such, the environmental
jurisdiction of a coastal state is the most complex and intricate subject matter of UNCLOS Ill.
52. For discussion of differences in sovereign rights and jurisdiction, see infra text
accompanying notes 53-58.
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The second problem lies in the distinction between "sovereignty" and
"jurisdiction." UNCLOS III Article 56 gives states "sovereign rights" of
economic exploitation and exploration of natural resources including living and
non-living resources of the sea-bed, subsoil and superjacent waters in the EEZ.
These natural resources include the production of energy from water, currents
and winds.53 Article 56, however, gives states only "jurisdiction" over the
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine
scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 5' UNCLOS III does not define sovereignty or jurisdiction; nor does it
explicitly state how these words are to be interpreted. Because each word can
have several meanings, no clear rules or prohibitions are set by the treaty. States
are forced to speculate as to the level of control they may exert.
"Sovereignty," in legal terms, is defined as:
[t]he supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any
independent state is governed; supreme political authority; the supreme
will ... the international independence of a state, combined with the
right and power of regulating its internal affairs without dictation. ..."
"Sovereignty" is commonly defined as "[c]omplete independence and selfgovernment. '56
On the other hand, the legal definition of "jurisdiction" is "[a] term of
comprehensive import embracing every kind ofjudicial action .... Jurisdiction
defines the powers of courts to inquire into facts, apply the law, make decisions,
and declare judgment."57 However, "jurisdiction" can be more generally
defined as "1. The right and power to interpret and apply the law. 2. a. Authority
or control. b. The extent of authority or control. 3. The territorial range of
authority or control." 58
In applying these two definitions to the language of UNCLOS III Article 56,
states have the supreme and absolute power to regulate economic concerns in the
EEZ but have only limited jurisdiction over pollution control in the EEZ. This
segregation seems ironic considering coastal states are, essentially, free to explore
and exploit natural resources but are severely limited in protecting the environment that generates these resources.
The difference between the exercise of sovereign rights and the exercise of
jurisdictional rights is most evident when comparing a coastal state's authority
to control pollution with its authority to control fisheries in the EEZ. A coastal

53.

UNCLOS III Article 56.

54.

Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Black's Law Dictionary 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
The American Heritage Dictionary 1169 (2d College ed. 1985).
Black's Law Dictionary 853,(6th ed. 1990).
The American Heritage Dictionary 694 (2d College ed. 1985).
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state is given the sole and exclusive authority to control fishing within its EEZ.
The coastal state determines the allowable catch of living resources in the
zone. 9 In addition, under UNCLOS III Article 63, nationals of other states
fishing in the EEZ must comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the
respective coastal state.60
In contrast, the coastal state's ability to control pollution in the EEZ is
limited. A coastal state is precluded from enacting legislation that includes
greater restrictions or requirements than existing international minimum
standards. The coastal state may not impose design, construction or equipment
standards on vessels. If a coastal state believes higher standards are necessary,
it must prove the existence of a fragile ecosystem requiring additional regulation
to prevent total destruction. Such a burden ofproof is very difficult to meet and,
thus far, has been found satisfied only in some ice-covered areas."'
For the convention to be effective, the precise meaning of the terms "sovereignty" and "jurisdiction" must be made explicit. 62 If the meanings are not
clarified, states will be forced to guess as to what practices are acceptable under
international law. As a result, states may unknowingly subject themselves to
fines and penalties by the United Nations for either exceeding their powers or
avoiding their duties under the treaty.
63
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EEZ

In 1958, the United Nations recognized the need for international rules to
define coastal states' territorial boundaries. The first United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) convened in Geneva to meet that need.
Participants in the conference focused on four topics: (1) the territorial sea and
the contiguous zone; (2) the high seas; (3) the continental shelf; and (4) fishing
and conservation of the living resources of the High Seas." UNCLOS I
attempted to set the breadth of the territorial sea at six miles with an additional
six-mile contiguous zone for fiscal, customs, and sanitation regulation. 6s
UNCLOS I did not reach an agreement regarding territorial boundaries;" s

59. UNCLOS III Article 61.
60. These laws and regulations may relate, inter alia, to: (1) licensing of fisherman, vessels,
and equipment; (2) determining the species and amount of stock which may be caught; (3) regulating
the conduct of fisheries research programs; (4) placing observers on board ships; (5) landing any part
of the catch in ports of coastal states; (6) setting requirements for the training ofpersonnel or transfer
of fisheries technology; and (7) enforcing procedures. See UNCLOS III Article 62.
61. See UNCLOS III Article 234 and supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
63. For a detailed discussion ofthe evolution of the law of the sea, see Larson, supra note 50,
at 2-6. For a brief synopsis of major periods in the development of the international law of the sea,
see Appendix i.
64. Larson, supra note 50, at 6-7.
65. Ann L. Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea 10 (1976).
66. Larson, supra note 50, at 7.
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however, it did provide a starting point for discussion of an EEZ for the control
and exploitation of natural resources.
Two years later, the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS II) again sought to determine the breadth of both the territorial
sea and the contiguous zone.67 The participants also discussed the establishment of a six-mile zone beyond the territorial sea wherein a coastal state would
have exclusive control over fishing. The proposal failed only by a one-vote
margin, despite strong opposition to the proposal by major fishing states desiring
a minimum twelve-mile territorial sea. Countries such as Chile, Ecuador, and
Peru desired two hundred mile territorial seas.6 Like UNCLOS I, UNCLOS
II adjourned with little progress made.
Following UNCLOS II, Dr. Arvid Pardo, the Head ofthe Permanent Mission
of Malta to the United Nations, introduced an agenda to the United Nations
calling for a declaration and treaty regarding the purposes and uses of the seabed, ocean floor, and natural resources located therein.' This agenda resulted
in the passage of the "Pardo Resolution," which established an adhoc committee
to study the uses of the sea bed and ocean floor.7" This committee grew into
a standing committee, which became the prepatory Committee for the 1975
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).
Unlike UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II, UNCLOS III saw a compromise begin
to emerge at the first two sessions. An informal consensus among the delegates
arose that included the following: (1) twelve-mile territorial seas; (2) two
hundred mile economic zones; (3) coastal states' rights to the continental margin
beyond two hundred miles; and (4) a new concept for measuring the baseline
from which islands would measure their territorial boundaries.72 Even with this
growing consensus, a majority decision could not be reached, and the first two
sessions of the convention were dismissed with little progress towards an
international treaty. Delegates began to fear that failure to reach an international
agreement would result in coastal states taking unilateral actions that would
disrupt the work of the convention.7 3 The final text of UNCLOS III emerged
in the eighth session of the convention.
On April 30, 1982, UNCLOS III was adopted. The United States and three
other Western European countries voted against the measure because of concerns
about deep-sea mining provisions. Eastern European countries abstained from
the voting for the same reason.7 4 The treaty was opened for signature on

67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.

70.

Id. at 7-8.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 8.
Hollick, supra note 65, at 10.
Larson, supra note 50, at 1.2.
Bernard H. Oxman et al., Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma 147-49 (1983).
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December 10, 1982, but the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, and
West Germany refused to sign because of the deep-sea mining provisions.75
Although adopted in 1982, UNCLOS III was not ratified until February 18,
1994. It was on this date the requisite number of countries (sixty one), none of
them industrialized, ratified UNCLOS III. Subsequently, according to the terms
of UNCLOS III, the treaty became effective on November 16, 1994, and the
provisions establishing both the reach of the EEZ and the activities that may be
regulated in the EEZ became binding on the countries that ratified the treaty. 6
Despite the United States' disagreement with the convention, in 1983,
President Reagan issued Proclamation 5030 establishing an EEZ for the United
States, which mirrored the zone described in UNCLOS III. Thus, the fear of the
UNCLOS III delegates-unilateral action by nation states without a binding
agreement-was realized. Like the convention, Proclamation 5030 created an
EEZ extending two hundred miles" in which the United States had sovereign
rights over exploitation matters, such as fisheries and deep-sea mining.7" In
addition, the United States claimed jurisdiction over all matters concerning the
protection and preservation of the marine environment in this zone.79
In 1988, the United States again took unilateral action to extend its sovereign
rights. President Reagan extended the breadth of the territorial sea from three
miles to twelve miles.80 President Reagan's justification for this extension was
national security.8 ' This extension was significant because it raised questions
about the reach of a state of the United States' sovereignty in the area between
the old three-mile territorial sea and the new twelve-mile territorial sea. 2
V.

POLLUTION CONTROL BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

Some countries have enacted their own pollution control laws that affect the
area within their EEZs or beyond their territorial seas. These laws are significant
because international law can be created from international agreements,
customary practices, or general principles of common legal systems.8 3 Thus,

75.
76.

Id. at 147.
S. Con. Res. 72, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see also The LOS Convention in the UN,

Ocean Policy News (Council on Ocean Law, Washington, D.C.), March 1994, at 1. For discussion
of differences between signing and ratifying a treaty, see supra note 7.
77. 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989).
81. Id.
82.

Letter from Michael J. Matheson, Acting Legal Advisor, to Douglas W. Knmiec, Acting

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel 11 (Aug. 15, 1988).
83.

Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 (1987).

General

principles of common legal systems include rules relating to the procedure and administration of
justice, such as the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel. Id. For a detailed discussion of the
sources of international law, see id.
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if this trend continues, the extension of the EEZ from a mere resource
exploitation zone to a pollution control zone would only be a matter of codifying
the customary international law. A brief overview of laws countries have
enacted follows.
A. Canada
In 1970, Canada enacted the Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act.8 In
this Act, Canada claimed sovereign rights over pollution control of one hundred
miles of Arctic waters adjacent to the mainland of Canada. Canada claimed this
action was necessary to supplement existing international law, which ensured
freedom of navigation to merchant states at the expense of protecting the marine
environment.8 5 This act required the submission of a plan by any person
wishing to perform activities that might result in the deposit of wastes in the
Arctic waters.8 6 Canada saw the threat of pollution in the Arctic waters as a
threat to Canada's national security and vital interests."'
The United States responded to this act with great hostility, feeling such
regulation impeded freedom of navigation of the seas. The United States
believed international law provided no basis for such a unilateral assertion by
Canada. Instead, it advocated the negotiation and adoption of international
agreements that would control pollution on the high seas. 8
Canada responded to the United States' position on April 17, 1979,9 by
demonstrating a large number of coastal states had asserted limited jurisdiction
over waters adjacent to their territorial seas. In fact, Canada maintained the
United States itself had claimed extended jurisdiction over customs enforcement
and fishing beyond its three-mile territorial limit as far as sixty-two miles."e In

84. 9 I.L.M. 543 (1970).
85. Canada felt "[s]uch traditional concepts are of little or no relevance anywhere in the world
ifthey can be cited as precluding action by a coastal state to protect the environment." 9 I.L.M. 607,
610-11 (1970).
86. The procedure to gain approval is as follows: The plan is submitted to the Governor in
Council who has the power to require modification or to prohibit the execution if he believes such
plan would violate Section 1 of the Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act.
In addition to the "plan provision," the Governor in Council has power to adopt regulations
prohibiting ships from navigating within specified safety control zones unless such ships comply with
the standards set by the Canadian government. Included in these standards are regulations regarding
the construction of the ship, the construction ofmachinery and equipment, the manning of the ship,
and the quantity of cargo, fuel, water and other supplies allowed. Any ship that violates these
standards or requirements is subject to either a monetary penalty or seizure of the ship and its cargo.
87. Id. at 608.
88. 9 I.L.M. 605 (1970).
89. 9 I.L.M. 607 (1970).
90. In Presidential Proclamation Number 2667, the United States claimed jurisdiction over the
continental shelf to a distance of two hundred nautical miles. President Harry S. Truman stated this
area was now subject to the exclusive control of the United States in matters relating to the
exploration and conservation of natural resources of the subsoil and seabed. In essence, the United
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essence, Canada purported to merely claim the same rights to protect its vital
interests and national security as the United States had already claimed.9'
UNCLOS III explicitly provides states may not require vessel source
pollution standards ofdesign, construction, manning or equipment other than the
accepted international minimum standards.92 However, the convention does
recognize special circumstances in which a coastal state may enact laws as
necessary to control pollution in fragile ecosystems.93 UNCLOS III validated
a large portion of Canada's act, while at the same time invalidating the portion
concerning special standards of design and construction.
B. UnitedStates
As the government of Canada alleged, the United States has also engaged
in unilateral action to control pollution. A number of federal statutes regulate
pollution in the coastal waters: the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, better
known as the "Clean Water Act" (CWA), 9 the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA), 9' the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 9, the Ocean
Dumping Act (ODA),97 and the Deepwater Ports Act (DPA). 9s
1. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA)
The CWA regulates the maintenance and integrity of the "waters of the
United States" through extensive regulation of pollutant discharge. "Waters of
the United States" includes waters that are used, were used, or may be used in
interstate or foreign commerce and encompasses the territorial seas99 and
tributaries."° Federal courts have interpreted "waters of the United States"
broadly. "

States claimed sovereign rights over 700,000 additional square miles of the seabed. Larson, supra
note 50, at 5-6.
91. Canada also argued that international law is created primarily by state practice. It cited
instances where Canada extended jurisdiction to certain areas of the seas, the United States objected
to such extensions, and subsequently, the United States adopted similar measures.
In 1964, when Canada created a nine-mile contiguous fishing zone, the United States reacted with
hostility. But, only two years later, the United States did the same. Such acquiescence acknowledged the lawfulness of Canada's actions. 9 I.L.M. 607 (1970).
92. UNCLOS III Article 211(6).
93.
94.
95.

See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).

96. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(a) (1988).
97. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988).
98. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1988).
99. Under the CWA, the territorial sea is still defined as three nautical miles. 33 C.F.R. §
328.4 (1993).
100. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1993).
101. United States v. Sinclair Oil Co., 767 F. Supp. 200, 201 n.2 (D. Mont. 1990).
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In Section 1251(c) of the CWA, Congress stated:
[T]he President, acting through the Secretary of State and such national
and international organizations as he determines appropriate, shall take
such action as may be necessary to ensure that to the fullest extent
possible all foreign countries shall take meaningful action for the
prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution in their waters and
in international waters and for the achievement of goals regarding the
elimination of discharge of pollutants and the improvement of water
quality to at least the same extent as the United States does under its
laws.'02
This statement of congressional goals evidences Congress' intent that other
nations follow the United States' lead in pollution control and enact laws that
will, at a minimum, duplicate the regulations set by Congress.
If the United States ratifies UNCLOS III, it could no longer pervasively
regulate pollutant discharges beyond the limits of its territorial sea. The CWA
specifically addresses oil pollution in the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and
the outer continental shelf. 3 It prohibits the discharge of oil or other hazardous substances into those areas that ultimately effect natural resources and are
under the exclusive management authority of the United States. °4 Ratification
of UNCLOS III would invalidate CWA's prohibitions on pollutant discharge
beyond the contiguous zone, frustrating United States' protection of natural
resources.
2. The Oil PollutionAct of 1990 (OPA)
The OPA was based upon liability concepts of other federal statutes-in
particular, the CWA. 5 The OPA requires parties responsible for the discharge, from vessels or facilities, of oil that subsequently poses a threat to
navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic zone to pay
removal costs as well as damages resulting therefrom." 6
In addition to providing remedial measures, the OPA establishes construction
requirements for all newly built tank vessels. Any newly built tank vessel
operating in waters of the United States"0 7 must have "double hulls." The act

102. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1976).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1988).
104. Id. These resources include fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines and beaches.
105. Federal and State Oil Spill Prevention Statutes Enacted, The Louisiana Environmental
Lawyer (Louisiana State Bar Association, Baton Rouge, La.), Summer 1991, at 1.
106. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (Supp. V 1993); Federal andState Oil Spill Prevention Statutes Enacted,
The Louisiana Environmental Lawyer (Louisiana State Bar Association, Baton Rouge, La.), Summer
1991, at 1.
107. The OPA applies to the EEZ and navigable waters of the United States. The EEZ is
defined by Presidential Proclamation Number 5030. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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also provides for a "phase out" of any vessels not meeting these construction
requirements.'
If the United States Senate ratifies UNCLOS III, the construction requirement provisions ofthe OPA will be invalidated. UNCLOS III explicitly provides
that states may not require vessel source pollution standards of design,
construction, manning or equipment other than the accepted international
minimum standards."°
3. The Outer ContinentalShelf Lands Act (OCSLA)
The purpose of the original OCSLA, enacted in 1953, was to provide the
United States with jurisdiction over the submerged lands of the outer continental
shelf and to provide the Secretary of the Interior with the authority to lease the
lands." 0 Such jurisdiction over the subsoil, seabed, or any artificial islands or
structures constructed thereon was exclusive. In essence, OCSLA treated the
outer continental shelf as if located within an area of exclusive federal
jurisdiction."'
In 1978, OCSLA was amended to establish management policies for the
exploitation of oil and gas on the outer continental shelf as well as policies for
protecting the marine environment." 2 "Marine environment" includes the
waters of the high seas, the contiguous zone, transitional and intertidal areas, salt
marshes, and wetlands within the coastal zone and on the outer continental
shelf."'
In addition, the federal government assumed responsibility for the minimization and elimination of the adverse effects of oil and gas production that impacts
on fishing and recreational activities. The 1978 Amendment provided a fund for
the prompt removal of oil spills and for the review of environmental and safety
regulations. These two legislative changes suggest the federal government sought
not only to remove oil spills after they occur, but also to prevent their occurrence.

Navigable waters ofthe United States include the territorial sea and other waters ofthe United States.
Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 486 (1990).
108. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2719 (Supp. V 1993); The LouisianaEnvironmentalLawyer (Louisiana
State Bar Association, Baton Rouge, La.), Summer 1991, at 1.
109. UNCLOS III Article 211(6). See also supra text accompanying note 92.
110. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
111. Id.
112. Id. OCSLA defines "marine environment" as:
[the] physical, atmospheric, and biological components, conditions and factors which
interactively determine the productivity, state, condition, and quality of the marine
ecosystem, including the waters of the high seas, the contiguous zone, transitional and
intertidal areas, salt marshes, and wetlands within the coastal zone and on the outer
continental shelf.
43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
113. Id.
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Ratification of UNCLOS III would limit United States' soverign power over
the outer continental shelf to exploration and exploitation of natural resources." 4 UNCLOS III Article 56 would only give the United States "jurisdiction"
Although
over protection and preservation of the marine environment.
jurisdiction may be determined to be the equivalent of sovereignty with regards
to resources on the outer continental shelf, this determination will not protect the
marine environment to the same extent as OCSLA. Under OCSLA, the United
States has sovereign rights to create policies that would protect the marine
environment from the territorial sea to the high seas. Unless the federal
government has the actual "sovereign" power to change regulations, its
"jurisdictional" power to review environmental and safety regulations is
worthless.
4. The Ocean DumpingAct (ODA)
The purpose of the ODA is to regulate the dumping of materials from either
land of the United States or United States' vessels, aircrafts, or agencies. The
ODA regulates dumping within either the territorial sea or the contiguous zone.
Thus, when the ODA was enacted, the United States was attempting to control
pollution beyond its territorial sea.
The ODA, however, defines the contiguous zone as extending to twelve, not
twenty-four, miles. Article 33 of ODA grants coastal states authority to control
sanitation in the contiguous zone."' To conform to UNCLOS III, Congress
would have to amend ODA to provide for a twelve-mile territorial sea and a
twenty-four mile contiguous zone.
5. The Deepwater Ports Act (DPA)
A "deepwater port" is any fixed or floating structure or group of structures
located off the coast of the United States. " 6 According to Section 1502(10),
the regulation of these structures extends beyond the territorial sea. The DPA
is another United States' unilateral action to control pollution beyond its
territorial boundaries.
If ratified, UNCLOS III would limit the ability of the United States to
regulate these deepwater ports. UNCLOS III Article 56 allows coastal states to
exercise only limited jurisdiction over artificial islands and structures located
within the EEZ. In addition, the regulation of such ports would not fit within the
coastal state's authority in the contiguous zone." 7

114. See supra note 71.
115. For discussion of the interpretation of "sanitation," see supra text accompanying notes 2123.
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1502(10) (1994).
117. For discussion of coastal state's authority in the contiguous zone, see supra text
accompanying note 20.
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C. India
In 1976, India enacted The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive
Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act." 8 Like UNCLOS III, India
delineated the different zones as follows: the territorial sea extended to a distance
oftwelve miles, and the continental shelf and EEZ extended to a distance of two
hundred miles.
While the delineation of the zones is similar to UNCLOS III, two main
differences exist. First, no provisions were made for a contiguous zone. Second,
in the continental shelf zone, India proclaimed full and exclusive sovereign rights
as compared to the limited sovereign rights granted by UNCLOS III. The
inclusion of the word "full" is an important modification. This suggests India
sought not only to control economic activities in its EEZ, but all other activities
as well. UNCLOS III does not provide that states will enjoy full exclusive.
sovereignty. Instead, UNCLOS III limits a coastal state's exertion of sovereign
rights in the EEZ to economic activities." 9
Like UNCLOS III, India claims sovereign rights over the exploration and
exploitation of both living and non-living resources as well as over resources
used for the production of energy from tides, winds, and waters in the EEZ.
Unlike UNCLOS III, India claims exclusive rights and jurisdiction over the
construction, maintenance, or operation of artificial islands, offshore terminals,
installations, and other structures used in the exploitation and exploration of
resources. Likewise, India claims exclusive control and jurisdiction to preserve
and protect the marine environment and control pollution in the EEZ.
As of August 15, 1985, India's government had not ratified UNCLOS III,
although it did sign the final act and convention. 20 If India ratifies an
unamended version of UNCLOS III, the additional measures taken to preserve
and protect their marine environment will be superseded, substantially decreasing
the effectiveness of their pollution control mechanisms.
D. Iran and Saudi Arabia

In a 1978 regional convention, Iran and Saudi Arabia sought to prevent
pollution of the Persian Gulf with methods similar to Canada's. In addition to
accepted regulation of activities within the territorial sea, contiguous zone, and
continental shelf, the Iranians and Saudi Arabians regulated access to the Persian
Gulf. In this area, which included the territorial sea and superjacent waters of
the continental shelf, virtually all vessels were subject to regulation and
inspection.' 21 If an inspector found a ship did not fulfill the regulations or
118. William T. Burke, International Law of the Sea Documents andNotes 193-97(7th ed. 1987).
119. For a discussion of a coastal state's sovereign rights in the EEZ, see supra text
accompanying notes 24-29.
120. For a discussion of the differences between signing and ratifying a treaty, see supra note 7.
121. Charles G. MacDonald, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea 162-67 (1980).
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created an unreasonable threat ofharm to the marine environment, he could take

all action necessary to ensure the vessel would not sail until such regulations
were met.
The governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia justified additional regulation
because the Persian Gulf has special pollution concerns due to the volume of oil
tanker traffic.'
They also justified the additional regulation with national
security interests." Other nations criticized the regulations because it allowed
Iran and Saudi Arabia to inspect tankers, not only for environmental reasons, but
also to find shipments of weapons, contraband, and even terrorist groups. Iran,
however, claimed the regulations encouraged other Persian Gulf states to enact
similar legislation to protect the environment from a major oil spill as a result
of terrorist attacks.
As of August 15, 1985, neither Iran's nor Saudi Arabia's government had
ratified UNCLOS III. Iran signed both the final act and the convention; Saudi
Arabia has only signed the convention. 24 If both Iran and Saudi Arabia ratify
an unamended version of UNCLOS III, the regional agreement between the two
nations will be superseded, substantially decreasing the effectiveness of their
pollution control mechanisms.
E. Agreements Among Nations
In addition to UNCLOS III, the United Nations, in 1973, convened the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL).' 25 MARPOL is designed to eliminate intentional pollution and
minimize negligent pollution of the marine environment by oil. This convention
regulates the construction of tankers as well as drilling rigs and other platforms.
MARPOL Article 9, however, states that
nothing shall prejudice the codification and development of the law of
the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea...
nor the present or future claims and legal views of any State concerning
the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State
jurisdiction."2 6

122. Sixty percent of the world's oil is shipped via the Persian Gulf. The risk of an oil spill is
far greater here than in other areas. Id. at 164.
123. Id. The presence of oil tankers in the gulf provides ample opportunities for terrorists. This
possibility is not so far-fetched. In fact, it was reinforced by a 1979 warning from the United States
Department ofMaritime Affairs and Defense Mapping which warned crews of oil tankers to be alert
for such an attack by terrorist groups. It was again reinforced when Lloyd's of London required
tankers in the Persian Gulf to purchase special war-zone insurance. Id. at 165.
124. For a discussion ofthe difference between signing and ratifying a treaty, see supra note 7.
125. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18 at 461 (1976); 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973) [hereinafter referred
to by its MARPOL article number].
126. MARPOL Article 9.
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Under UNCLOS III, a coastal state cannot require special design or construction
standards for vessels operating within the state's EEZ. 7 This prohibition
conflicts with MARPOL's regulations for design and construction of ships and
drilling rigs. It would seem that, like with domestic law, the later law prevails.
The provisions of UNCLOS III would prevail over MARPOL's design and
construction requirements.
Similar to UNCLOS III, MARPOL provides regulations for "special areas."
These areas include the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the
Red Sea, and the "Gulf area."' The Gulf area is the area located northwest
of the rhumb line between Ras al Hadd and Ras al Fastch."' In this area,
tankers and ships shall not discharge oil or any oily mixture. In addition, ships
shall not discharge any oil drainage or sludge, dirty ballast, and tank washing
waters. 3 With the ratification of UNCLOS III, the control or possibility of
control in the special areas defined by MARPOL are ambiguous. UNCLOS III
specifically recognizes only Canada as a "special area." The question, whether
UNCLOS III should recognize the special areas designated in MARPOL, or if
MARPOL should recognize the special area designated in UNCLOS III, is
unanswered.
VI.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCLUSIVE POLLUTION CONTROL ZONE

Less developed countries may resist expanding the regulatory scope of the
EEZ to include an exclusive pollution control zone. A principal reason
UNCLOS III was not ratified immediately was because less developed countries
feared the creation of international pollution control standards would require
costly regulations and policies. Less developed countries lacked the capital they
would have needed if extensive design or construction requirements were
imposed on vessels and tankers. Thus, extensive new requirements would have
excluded them from international commerce.
While the less developed countries' concerns are significant, the health and
quality of the world's oceans is more important. International cooperation is
necessary to preserve the oceans. As one commentator stated, "two countries
prohibiting oily discharges from tank cleaning operations won't make much of
a dent in the problem if the rest of the world's tanker fleet does not follow
suit."' ' Likewise, if one country enacts pervasive regulations that significantly
prevent pollution in the EEZ and other countries do not follow suit, little
progress will be made in protecting the marine environment.
If the EEZ expands to encompass exclusive pollution control, the tension
between the states of the United States and the federal government over

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

UNCLOS III Article 60.
MARPOL Article 10(1).
MARPOL Article 10(2).
MARPOL Article 10(1).
Alan Sielen, Steps Towarda Global Oceans View, 14 EPA J. 21, 22 (1988).
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regulation of the territorial sea, as well as the contiguous zone and the EEZ, will
increase. The extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles forshadowed the
tension expanding federal control in the EEZ could create. 32 For example, the
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) defines the United States coastal zone
as "extending to the boundary of the territorial sea." 33 The CZMA allows
coastal states of the United States to draft a management plan for coastal
resources located within the coastal zone, with approval from the federal
government. 34 Louisiana submitted a plan to the federal government but
defined "coastal zone" as "pursuant to state law," which is three marine leagues
or nine nautical miles. The federal government rejected Louisiana's plan of
regulation extending to nine, not three, miles. However, after the extension of
miles, the federal government may no longer object
the territorial sea to twelve
3
to Louisiana's plan.' 5
The closer an area is to the coastline, the greater a state's interest in
protecting the sea. Anything that occurs in close proximity and threatens the
health, safety or welfare of the citizens of the coastal state falls directly within
the broad police powers of the states. However, as an area extends further into
the ocean, the federal interests in national security and international trade
The balancing between federal and state interests is 13consistently
increase.
7
seen in cases involving the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
The Commerce Clause gives the federal government broad power to control
and regulate interstate commerce.13 Congress undoubtedly has the power to
regulate foreign commerce as the states ceded this power when the Constitution
was ratified. Regulation to control pollution in the EEZ will affect interstate
commerce. If regulations are too strict, they may impede navigation and foreign
trade. If regulations are too lenient, however, oil spills or other accidents may
hamper marine transportation and the production or exploitation of oil, gas, and
other natural resources located within the seas.
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,'" the United States Supreme Court
recognized states may impose special regulations on interstate commerce where
local conditions were unique. The Court found Pennsylvania had a heightened

132. See supra text accompanying note 82. (The 1988 Reagan Proclamation caused great
difficulty in terms of federal-state relations. With the additional nine miles of sovereignty, some
states claimed they should control this area. Instead, the federal government claims the additional
nine miles only gave it the right to control and manage-states were still limited to a three-mile
territorial sea.).
133. New TerritorialBoundary, Aquanotes (Louisiana Sea Grant, Baton Rouge, La.), Spring
1989, at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Milner S. Ball, The Law of the Sea, Federal-State Relations and the Extension of the
Territorial Sea 59-76 (1978).
137. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
138. Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 148-50 (2d ed., 1991).
139. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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interest in regulating ships entering and leaving the port of Philadelphia even if
interstate commerce was forced to bear a burden. The main inquiry was whether
the state's interest in the problem outweighs the federal interest in uniformity of
the laws. Although the Cooley decision was based on activities within the
territorial sea of the state, it may have an impact on waters beyond twelve miles
because pollution occurring beyond this point will ultimately impact the shores
of a coastal state. Cooley brought to light questions regarding: (1) the national
versus local nature of the problem, (2) the commercial versus police powers
purpose of the regulation, and (3) the directness of the effect on interstate
commerce." UNCLOS III raises the same questions.
Because UNCLOS III has special provisions regarding ice-covered areas
considered to be fragile ecosystems, the delegates to UNCLOS III have extended
the rationale of Cooley to the international arena. Where special circumstances
or a fragile ecosystem exists, coastal states may enact more stringent laws. The
same may apply to the United States. For example, assume the United States
has a fragile ecosystem and receives authority to impose significant regulations
on pollution control in this area. In turn, suppose this area is located fifty miles
off of the coast of a state of the United States. The state also seeks to enact
pollution regulations in this zone to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens.
Clearly the federal government has the power to regulate activities within the
territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and the continental shelf. A question
arises, though, as to the power of a state to exert concurrent jurisdiction over any
of these areas. Clear precedent exists that a state has the ability to exert
sovereign rights up to three miles from the coastline. 4' Beyond this limit, the
exertion of sovereignty by a state is questionable.
Whether a state of the United States or the federal government controls up
to twelve miles remains significant in terms of UNCLOS III. States of the
United States have often taken action, sometimes inappropriately, to regulate
activities beyond their territorial seas. Congress has been quick to end such
assertions of power. 42 In the last few decades, however, Congress has
enlarged the role a coastal state may play in regulating the ocean. This increase
is due to states demanding more influence in areas related to local concerns.
States feel that they are in a better position than43 the federal government to
understand the peculiar needs of their ecosystem.

140. Stone, supra note 138, at 268-69.
141. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984) (Congressional intent in
CWA was to allow states to take an active role in abating water pollution, but the federal-state
partnership in pollution regulation applies only to water within the state's jurisdiction which was
determined to be three nautical miles from the coastline).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 133-135.
143. Moving Ahead on Ocean Governance, Ocean Governance Study Group 31 (Biliana CicinSain & Lori L. Denno, eds., 1994).
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VII. CONCLUSION

UNCLOS III provides a starting point for effective control of marine
pollution; however, "the existence of international environmental law does not
of itself guarantee better protection for the oceans."'" An individual nation
must be responsible for the pollution that occurs in the ocean surrounding its
territory. To assume this responsibility, however, the nation must be trusted by
the international community to establish fair and equitable rules. This surrender
of power to the nation need not be complete. The international community may
require that certain minimum standards be met. However, a nation should be
free to go above and beyond these standards if it has compelling reasons.
The opportunity to better protect the marine environment lies within the
EEZ. UNCLOS III already grants each nation sovereign rights over both the
exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of natural resources and
the exploitation and exploration of energy production by water, currents and
wind. A nation, however, has only limited jurisdiction over matters regarding
the use of artificial islands and structures, the performance of marine scientific
research, and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Over
the past decades, many nations expressed a desire, through laws and policies, to
extend the scope ofpollution regulation. With new advances in technology, such
as Shell Oil Company's plans to develop the deepest offshore oil rig in the Gulf
of Mexico, it is time for the United Nations to amend UNCLOS III to allow such
regulation.
The United States could impel such an amendment. The United States has
already been instrumental in amending the deep-sea mining provisions of
UNCLOS III. The United States could influence the United Nations to amend
UNCLOS III to give coastal states a greater role in pollution control. If the
United Nations refuses to amend UNCLOS III, the United States Senate should
refrain from ratifying the treaty.
If the United Nations will consider amending UNCLOS III, the following
changes should be made. First, UNCLOS III should be amended to define
"sanitation" as used in the listed powers of coastal states in the contiguous zone.
This definition should be very broad to provide greater control over pollution. ""
Second, UNCLOS III should be amended to give a coastal state sovereign
rights within its EEZ. UNCLOS III already gives coastal states sovereign rights
to control economic matters, e.g., fishing, scientific research, and deep-sea
mining. The extension of the EEZ to a pollution control zone need not be
mandatory. Each state still would be required to meet the existing minimum

144. Sielen, supra note 131.
145. "Sanitation" is broadly defined as the "formulation and application of measures designed
to protect public health." The American Heritage Dictionary 1090 (2d ed. 1985). See alsosupra text
accompanying notes 20-23.
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international standards for pollution control. However, a coastal state should be
allowed to enact additional measures to control particular pollution problems in
its EEZ, as long as these measures are "reasonable" and not for the sole purpose
of impeding navigation or harming the interests of less developed countries. The
United Nations is not equipped to determine what pollution controls each coastal
state requires.
UNCLOS III provides a foundation for comprehensive regulations regarding
economic, environmental, and national security matters. For these regulations to
be effective, the above amendments must be enacted, or UNCLOS III will create
more uncertainties than remedies.
Amy deGeneres Berret
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APPENDIX I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
6th c.

Greek city-states, Roman Republic, and Italian cities began

to exercise jurisdiction over adjacent waters. "
13th C.
1492
1494

1605
1930

Venice claims sovereign rights over the Adriatic Sea. 47
Discovery of the New World by Christopher Columbus. 4
Pope Alexander VI issues the Treaty of Tordesillas that
divided the Southern Hemisphere between Spain and
Portugal.' 49
Grotius writes the De JurePraedaeCommentariusthat laid
the groundwork for discussion at UNCLOS III."5o
The Hague Convention is convened to determine the breadth
of the territorial sea and the territorial boundaries of coastal
states.'15

1945

1947
1958

1960

1970

1975

President Truman issues Proclamation Number 2667 in
which the U.S. claimed jurisdiction over the continental
52
shelf to a distance of 200 miles; Mexico follows suit.
Chile claims sovereign rights over the continental shelf to a
distance of 200 miles; Peru and Ecquador follow suit.'
United Nations holds the first conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS I) to determine the breadth of the territorial
34
sea, the contiguous zone and the continental shelf.
United Nations convenes the second conference on the law
of the sea (UNCLOS II) to determine the breadth of the
territorial sea and the contiguous zone. 5'
Canada enacts Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act,
rights over pollution control to a
which claims sovereign
156
distance of 100 miles.
United Nations convenes the third conference on the law of
the sea (UNCLOS III) to determine the breadth of the

146. Larson, supra note 50, at 2.
147. Thomas W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea 3-6 (1911), in Gary Knight and Hungdah
Chiu, The International Law of the Sea 11-12 (1991).
148.
D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea 2-3 (1982), in Gary Knight and Hungdah

Chiu, The International Law of the Sea 12 (1991).
149.

Larson, supra note 50, at 3.

150.
151.
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Id. at 5.
Hollick, supra note 65, at 18-61.
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154.
155.
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Id. at 7.
9 I.L.M. 543 (1970).
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1976
1982
1983
1988
1991
Feb. 18,1994
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territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ, and the
continental shelf; Informal Single Negotiating Text emerges
in 8th Session. 7
India enacts the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf,
Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones
58
Act.1
UNCLOS III is adopted by a vote of 130 to 4 and the
convention is opened for signature; the United States does
not sign.'
President Reagan issues Proclamation 5030 that creates a
U.S. EEZ 6
President Reagan issues Proclamation 5928 that extends
the
6
territorial seas of the U.S. from 3 miles to 12 miles.' '
Poland enacts Polish Law on the Territorial Waters of 4/91
that extends pollution control laws of Poland to the
EEZ.' 62
Bosnia becomes the 61st member nation to ratify UNCLOS
111.163

June 30, 1994
July 29, 1994
Nov. 1994

157.
158.
1987).
159.

160.

The Clinton administration notifies the Foreign Relations
Committee that President Clinton will sign an agreement
amending UNCLOS III'
President Clinton signs amending agreement that provisionally binds the United States to the
agreement and
65
portions of UNCLOS III for four years.
UNCLOS III becomes binding international law on signatory nations.'"

Hollick, supra note 65, at 10.
William T. Burke, International Law of the Sea Documents and Notes 193-97 (7th ed.
Bernard H. Oxman et al., Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma 147-49 (1983).

48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983).
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54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989).
162. WL 501392; NTIS PB91-961-961030 (March 2, 1991).
163. The LOS Convention in the UN, Ocean Pol'y News (Council on Ocean Law, Washington,
D.C.), March 1994, at 1.
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